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Hamessing the Power of Information to Protect Our
Public Natural Resource Legacy
Alyson C. Flournoy,* Heather Halter** & Christina Storz***
I. Introduction
Over the past century, Congress has enacted numerous laws that
recognize the value of the vast store of natural resources under federal
control.' These laws govern the management and use of water and lands, as
well as the ecosystems, biodiversity, and minerals found in and on these
waters and lands. A remarkable number of these statutes explicitly embrace
the goal of preserving public natural resources and the services and values
they provide for future generations.2 Some also articulate a goal or mandate
* U.F. Research Foundation Professor, University of Florida Levin College of Law.
** J.D. 2007, University of Florida Levin College of Law.
* J.D. anticipated 2008, University of Florida Levin College of Law.
1. See, e.g., Estuary Protection Act § 1, 16 U.S.C. § 1221 (2000) ("Congress finds and declares
that many estuaries m the United States are rich in a variety of natural, commercial, and other
resources, including environmental natural beauty, and are of immediate and potential value ....");
Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 § 302, 16 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (2000) ("[T]here is a national
interest in the effective management, beneficial use, protection, and development of the coastal
zone."); National Forests Management Act of 1976 § 11, 16 U.S.C. § 1609(a) (2000) ("Congress
declares that the National Forest System consists of units of federally owned forest, range, and
related lands throughout the United States and its territories, united into a nationally significant
system...."); Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 § 102, 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(2)
(2000) ("[T]he national interest will be best realized if the public lands and their resources are
periodically and systematically inventoried and their present and future use is projected through a
land use planning process ....").
2. See, e.g., National Park Service Organic Act § 1, 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) ("The service shall
promote and regulate the use of the Federal areas known as national parks, monuments, and
reservations ... to conserve the scenery and the natural and histonc objects and the wildlife
therein.., by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.");
Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965 § 1, 16 U.S.C. § 460 (2000) ("The Congress finds
and declares it to be desirable that all American People of present and future generations be assured
adequate outdoor recreation resources ...."); National Historic Preservation Act Amendments of
1980 § 101(a), 16 U.S.C. § 470(b)(4) (2000) ("[T]he preservation of this irreplaceable heritage is in
the public interest so that its vital legacy of cultural, educational, aesthetic, inspirational, economic,
and energy benefits will be maintained and enriched for future generations of Americans .... );
Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979 § 2(b), 16 U.S.C. § 470aa(b) (2000) ("The
purpose of this chapter is to secure, for the present and future benefit of the American people, the
protection of archaeological resources and sites which are on public lands and Indian lands ....");
National Wildlife Refuge System Improvements Act of 1997 § 4, 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(2) (2000)
("The mission of the [Wildlife Refuge] System is to administer a national network of lands and
waters for the conservation, management, and where appropriate, restoration of the fish, wildlife,
and plant resources ... for the benefit of present and future generations of Americans.");
Wilderness Act § 2, 16 U.S.C. § 113 1(a) (2000) ("[lt is hereby declared to be the policy of the
Congress to secure for the American people of present and future generations the benefits of an
enduring resource of wilderness."); 16 U.S.C. § 1221 (2000) ("Congress finds and declares that
many estuaries in the United States are rich in a variety of natural, commercial, and other resources,
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of sustainable use of public natural resources. 3 All of these statutes reflect an
awareness that those of us alive today will leave a legacy of public natural
resources to the succeeding generation.4 They also implicitly embrace the
idea that we should pay attention to what that legacy will look like-the
quantity and quality of the public natural resources we leave the next
generation. 5
including environmental natural beauty, and are of immediate and potential value .... ), Wild and
Scenic Rivers Act § 1, 16 U.S.C. § 1271 (2000) ("It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United
States that certain selected rivers ... possess outstandingly remarkable scenic, recreational,
geologic, fish and wildlife, historic, cultural, or other similar values... and that they and their
immediate environments shall be protected for the benefit and enjoyment of present and future
generations."); 16 U.S.C. § 145 1(a) ("[T]he coastal zone is rich in a variety of natural, commercial,
recreational, ecological, industrial, and esthetic resources of immediate and potential value to the
present and future well-being of the Nation."); 16 U.S.C. § 1609(a) ("Congress declares that the
National Forest System consists of units of federally owned forest, range, and related lands
throughout the United States and its territories, united into a nationally significant system .... );
Alaska National Interests Lands Conservation Act § 101, 16 U.S.C. § 3101(a) (2000) ("In order to
preserve for the benefit, use, education, and inspiration of present and future generations certain
lands and waters ...."); Emergency Wetlands Resources Act of 1986 § 2, 16 U.S.C. § 3901(a)(9)
(2000) ("[Tlhe existing Federal, State, and private cooperation in wetlands conservation should be
strengthened in order to minimize further losses of these valuable areas and to assure their
management in the public interest for this and future generations."); National Maritime Heritage Act
of 1994 § 2, 16 U.S.C. § 5401(5) (2000) ("The preservation of this irreplaceable maritime heritage
is in the public interest so that its vital legacy of cultural, educational, aesthetic, inspirational, and
economic benefits will be maintained and enriched for future generations of Americans."); National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) § 101, 42 U.S.C. §4331(a) (2000) ("The
Congress ... declares that it is the continuing policy of the Federal government . . . to create and
maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the
social, economic, and other requirements of present and future generations of Americans."); Energy
Reorganization Act of 1974 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 5801(a) (2000) ("The Congress hereby declares that
the general welfare and the common defense and security require effective action to develop, and
increase the efficiency and reliability of use of, all energy sources to meet the needs of present and
future generations ....").
3. See, e.g., Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 § 2, 16 U.S.C. § 529 (2000) ("The
Secretary of Agriculture is authorized and directed to develop and administer the renewable surface
resources of the national forests for multiple use and sustained yield of the several products and
services obtained therefrom."); 16 U.S.C. § 1604(e) (requiring that forest-management plans
provide for multiple use and sustained yield); Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management (Magnuson) Act § 301, 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1) (2000) (setting a national standard
under which "[c]onservation and management measures shall prevent overfishing while achieving,
on a continuing basis, the optimum yield from each fishery for the United States fishing industry");
43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(7) (mandating that federal land be managed on the bases of multiple use and
sustained yield).
4. The concept of a generation is somewhat imprecise; it is a construct, not a physical reality.
The word is used here and elsewhere to refer both to a group of individuals of roughly the same age
and to the period of time between the birth of succeeding generations. See, e.g., MERRIAM-
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 521 (11 th ed. 2006) (defining generation as both "a body of
living beings constituting a single step in the line of descent from an ancestor" and "the average
span of time between the birth of parents and of their offspring").
5. In addition to these federal laws, at least thirty-two states include references to the interests
of future generations--or references to sustainability or sustainable development-in statutes
related to the use of natural resources. A complete list of these states and state statutes is on file
with the author. Some are more protective of the resource legacy-making it an explicit priority
among competing demands-and others merely invoke it in a list of competing priorities to be
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However, in practice, our laws have proven unequal to the lofty
objectives of preserving a legacy of public natural resources for our children
or achieving sustainable use of these resources. There are many factors that
contribute to this shortfall, but inherent inadequacies in the design of these
statutes cannot be overlooked as an important determinant. Despite the
statutes' broadly stated aspirations toward sustainability and protection of the
interests of future generations, only a handful of these statutes include strong
and enforceable mandates for sustainable resource use.6 Many of these
statutes accord natural resource-management agencies broad discretion to
balance and permit a long list of competing uses of a given resource,
including degrading and depleting uses.7 They lack any clear mandate that
the agency protect any particular quantity or quality of a given resource for
today, much less for future generations.
Thus our laws often promise far more than they can deliver. It should
therefore come as no surprise that in practice, many of our public natural
resources are declining in quantity and quality.8 Without an effective legal
reconciled, with little direction to prioritize resource interests of future generations. Compare, e.g.,
MINN. STAT. ANN. § I16P.01 (West 2005) ("[T]o ensure wise stewardship of the state's
environment and natural resources for the benefit of current citizens and future
generations ... requires foresight, planning, and long-term activities .... [To] undertake such
activities properly, a long-term, consistent, and stable source of funding must be provided."), with
TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 2.004 (Vernon 2004) (providing that the Agriculture Policy Board shall
"advocate and recommend strategies for agriculture that enhance agriculture production, income,
and employment, that benefit consumers, and that promote efficient and sustainable use of natural
resources").
6. For example, the "take" prohibition in the Endangered Species Act, while not absolute, is
frequently cited as a rare example of a relatively strong mandate that makes clear how to resolve a
conflict among competing values. See, e.g, Federico Cheever & Michael Balster, The Take
Prohibition in Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act: Contradictions, Ugly Duckhngs, and
Conservation of Species, 34 ENVTL. L. 363, 365 (2004) (describing the prohibition as "simple,
unambiguous, and breathtaking in its reach and power"). Compare, e.g., Endangered Species Act of
1973 § 9(a)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2000) (making it unlawful "to take any [endangered]
species within the United States"), with Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136
(providing generally for the establishment and preservation of federal wilderness areas), and
National Forest Management Act § 6(g)(3)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B) (requiring land-
management regulations to "provide, where appropriate, to the degree practicable, for steps to be
taken to preserve the diversity of tree species"), and 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1) (requiring fishery
regulations to "prevent overfishing while achieving, on a continuing basis, the optimum yield from
each fishery").
7. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 529 ("In the administration of the national forests due consideration
shall be given to the relative values of the various resources in particular areas."); Clean Water Act
§ 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000) (providing for the issuance of permits for "the discharge of dredged
or fill material into the navigable waters"); see also Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542
U.S. 55, 58 (2004) (discussing "multiple use management" as "a deceptively simple term that
describes the enormously complicated task of striking a balance among the many competing uses to
which land can be put").
8. See, e.g., MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING:
BIODIVERSITY SYNTHESIS 2-5 (2005), available at http://www.millenniumassessment.org/
documents/document.354.aspx.pdf (describing the rapid conversion of ecosystems-including
increasing rates of extinction, declining genetic diversity, and more homogeneous distribution of
species-and predicting similar changes in the future); MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT,
2008] 1577
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mechanism to check the decline, this pattern of incremental resource
depletion and degradation will likely continue. This Article therefore
considers the possibility that we need, and should consider enacting, a law
that provides an effective check on the degradation and depletion of public
natural resources across the board.9 Effective preservation of a public natural
resource legacy requires a statute that can achieve two core objectives: to
define the public natural resource legacy we wish to leave to our children and
grandchildren, and to prohibit actions that impair that legacy.
Many commentators have suggested that the National Environmental
Policy Act l (NEPA) was enacted to accomplish these objectives." Thus,
ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: WETLANDS AND WATER SYNTHESIS 2-10 (2005),
available at http://www.millenniumassessment.org/documents/document.358.aspx.pdf (describing
the causes of wetland loss and degradation and its effect on population growth, economies, and
consumption patterns); NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NOAA'S NATIONAL MARINE
FISHERIES SERVICE REPORT ON THE STATUS OF THE U.S. FISHERIES FOR 2006, at 5 (2006),
available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/domes-fish/StatusoFisheries/2006/2006RTCFinal_
Report.pdf (reporting on the increasing number of overfished stocks); WELFARE RANCHING: THE
SUBSIDIZED DESTRUCTION OF THE AMERICAN WEST 162-257 (George Wuerthner & Mollie
Matteson eds., 2002) (detailing the degradation of various natural resources and life forms); Energy
Info. Admin., U.S. Dep't of Energy, Energy in the United States: 1635-2000 (2007),
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/eh/frame.html (describing the historical use and environmental
impact of natural resources such as coal and petroleum). See generally ALYSON C. FLOURNOY ET
AL., SQUANDERING PUBLIC RESOURCES (2007) (examining government policies that result in the
degradation of natural resources).
9. It can be argued that the failure to achieve sustainable use is not a shortcoming, but the
intended and desired outcome achieved by laws that incorporate a combination of weak mandates
and unattainable ones. See John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 233, 233-35 (1990) (arguing that legislators reap the "benefits of 'voting for health and the
environment' by passing environmental statutes that ignore obstacles to implementation and set
unattainable standards). However, given the complexity of the stated goals, the opaque decision-
making processes, and the limited information on resource use and the impacts of individual
decisions, it seems at least possible that neither lawmakers nor the public are fully aware of the
effects of the design of current law. Thus, it may be fairer to attribute the incoherence in our
statutes to a failure to seriously engage the question of what legacy we wish to leave, how to
preserve this legacy, the costs involved, and the importance of doing so. Until we seriously debate
the question of the resource legacy we wish to leave to future generations and how to balance the
needs of the present and future generations, we are unlikely to leave any consciously chosen legacy.
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2000). NEPA requires federal agencies to collect and evaluate
information on environmental impacts and alternative actions before they undertake, fund, or permit
any major action that would significantly affect the environment. Id. § 4332.
11. See, e.g., LYNTON KEITH CALDWELL, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: AN
AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE, at xvi-xvii, 2-9, 33-38 (1998) (noting that one of NEPA's goals was to
set a national environmental policy that would both (1) instruct agencies how to balance competing
interests and (2) encourage agencies to articulate values without legislating them); Matthew J.
Lindstrom, Procedures Without Purpose: The Withering Away of the National Environmental
Policy Act's Substantive Law, 20 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 245, 245-46 (2000) ("[NEPA]
provides a substantive environmental policy vision and institutional infrastructure in addition to
procedural mechanisms designed to enhance the salience of environmental values in federal agency
decision-making."); Paul S. Weiland, Amending the National Environmental Policy Act: Federal
Environmental Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 12 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 275, 281-82
(1997) (stating that NEPA was designed to establish the nation's priorities in environmental policy
and to ensure those policies and goals are carried out by the federal government); Nicholas Yost,
NEPA 's Promise-Partially Fulfilled, 20 ENVTL. L. 533, 533-34 (1990) (quoting one NEPA author
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one avenue to explore for protecting our public natural resource legacy is
NEPA's untapped potential. It is clear that NEPA currently lacks an
adequate substantive standard to ensure protection of a natural resource
legacy.' 2 Many commentators have lamented NEPA's lack of a substantive
standard over the years, and some have called for amending NEPA to include
a substantive standard of environmental protection.' 3 This Article considers
whether NEPA, reinforced with a substantive standard of protection, would
be the best tool for defining and protecting a public natural resource legacy.
A review of the critiques of NEPA, and specifically those focused on
how NEPA employs information, suggests that even with a substantive
standard, NEPA would not necessarily provide the best vehicle for defining
and protecting our resource legacy. After considering NEPA's merit and
potential as a tool for preserving our natural resource legacy, Part II of this
Article surveys the principal critiques of NEPA's approach to information
collection, analysis, and dissemination. Many of the shortcomings identified
in this survey would also impair an amended NEPA's power to define and
preserve our resource legacy.
In light of these critiques, in Part III, we propose an alternative model
for a statute better tailored to defining and protecting our public natural
resource legacy. Subpart III(A) briefly describes the contours of a statute
that could be called a National Environmental Legacy Act (NELA, or Legacy
Act). Subpart III(B) elaborates on how such a statute could harness the
power of information effectively to define and protect our public natural
resource legacy.
II. The National Environmental Policy Act: Information and the Protection
of Our Resource Legacy
If our goal is to define and protect a legacy of public natural resources
for the next generation, NEPA warrants serious consideration as the
appropriate vehicle for achieving that goal because of its broad scope and
explicit ambitions to preserve natural resources and environmental quality for
future generations. NEPA is premised on the recognition of "the profound
impact of man's activity on the interrelations of all components of the natural
as saying that NEPA "gives expression to our national goals and aspirations" and "provides a
statutory foundation to which administrators may refer").
12. Early in the implementation of NEPA, the Supreme Court ruled that NEPA lacks a
substantive standard of environmental protection. That is, it requires agencies to collect and
consider information, but it does not require that they choose an environmentally preferable action
or achieve any defined level of resource protection. See infra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
13. See Lindstrom, supra note 11, at 264-66 (discussing proposed reforms to fix NEPA's
inadequate substantive standard, including "amending NEPA to create a more explicit link between
its substantive policies and procedural mechanism"); Weiland, supra note 11, at 290-93 (advocating
an amendment to NEPA that clarifies environmental protection as a substantive goal in federal
decision making). But see Lynton K. Caldwell, NEPA Revisited. A Call for a Constitutional
Amendment, ENVTL. F., Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 18, 22 (calling for a constitutional amendment rather
than legislative reform of NEPA).
20081 1579
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environment, particularly the profound influences of population growth,
high-density urbanization, industrial expansion, resource exploitation, and
new and expanding technological advances."' 14 In its statement of policy,
NEPA recognizes "the critical importance of restoring and maintaining
environmental quality to the overall welfare and development of man.' 5 It
aspires to create and maintain conditions under which "man and nature can
exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other
requirements of present and future generations of Americans.' 6 In seeking
to carry out this ambition, NEPA adds to the federal government's
obligations a duty to use its resources "to the end that the Nation
may ... fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the
environment for succeeding generations."' 7 While NEPA also imposes the
duty that agencies seek to "attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the
environment," this is to be "without degradation, risk to health or safety, or
other undesirable and unintended consequences."'
18
Thus, NEPA can be fairly said to have at its core a legacy ambition-a
conscious recognition of a duty we owe as a nation to future generations. It
sets forth a policy that all federal agencies take steps to fulfill the role of
steward of our natural resources. Because of this congruence of NEPA's
stated goals and the goal of preserving a public natural resource legacy, it
makes sense to explore whether NEPA would be the most effective vehicle
for defining and protecting a natural resource legacy.
Any discussion of NEPA's potential must begin with the statute's most
frequently identified shortcoming: its lack of substantive force. The Supreme
Court's ruling in the Strycker's Bay' 9 case that NEPA imposes no substantive
environmental duties on agencies crystallized NEPA's status as a purely
procedural statute.2° Critics have repeatedly pointed to this interpretation as
a primary impediment to achieving many of the broad policies and duties
articulated in § 101 of the Act. 2' Further, commentators disagree on whether
14. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id §4331(b).
18. Id. § 4331(b)(3).
19. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980).
20. See id. at 227-28 (holding that NEPA does not require agencies to select environmentally
preferable outcomes; it requires only that they comply with the statute's procedural requirements).
21. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm, The National Environmental Policy Act at Twenty: A Preface,
20 ENVTL. L. 447, 450 (1990) ("The coup de grace came when the Supreme Court held NEPA to be
essentially procedural, ignoring the high-minded aspirations contained in section 101 and apparently
considering NEPA to require just the paperwork and public disclosure specified in section 102.");
Lindstrom, supra note 11, at 258-62 ("[I]n Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen,
the Supreme Court effectively squashed any possibility of judicial enforcement of NEPA's
substantial goals."). Oliver Houck has described the shortcoming as the lack of precision in
articulating the policy. Oliver A. Houck, Is that All? A Review of The National Environmental
Policy Act, An Agenda for the Future, by Lynton Keith Caldwell, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F.
173, 178-80 (2000).
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the Strycker's Bay decision is even a proper interpretation of NEPA.
Regardless, under the Supreme Court's interpretation, § 102 of NEPA
primarily requires federal agencies to: (1) consider environmental impacts of
and alternatives to major proposed actions using a systematic, interdis-
ciplinary approach,2 3 and (2) prepare detailed statements on these impacts.24
Even so interpreted, most agree that NEPA has had substantial beneficial
effects.25  Thus, some might argue that the preferred route to protecting a
natural resource legacy would be to amend NEPA to incorporate a long-
needed substantive standard.
The lack of a substantive standard has also given rise to the critique that
NEPA is flawed because of the inherent tension between the rationalist
comprehensive model of decision making on which environmental-impact-
assessment practice is premised and the lack of clear goals and priorities in
26the NEPA process. Requiring agencies to compile all the information
22. See Lynton K. Caldwell, Beyond NEPA: Future Significance of the National Environmental
Policy Act, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 203, 206, 221-22 (1998) (detailing at least four explanations
of NEPA's inadequacy in practice); Yost, supra note 11, at 539-41 (placing blame on the Supreme
Court's "consistently crabbed interpretations" of NEPA).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A), (B), (E).
24. Id. § 4332(2)(C). These duties are further elaborated in the Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ) regulations. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1508.28 (2008).
25. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: A STUDY
OF ITS EFFECTIVENESS AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS, at iii (1997) [hereinafter NEPA AT TWENTY-
FIVE], available at http://ceq.eh.doe.gov/nepa/nepa25fn.pdf (suggesting that NEPA has been a
success because it forces agencies to consider environmental consequences of their actions and
involves the public in the agency decision-making process); Stark Ackerman, Observations on the
Transformation of the Forest Service: The Effects of the National Environmental Policy Act on U.S.
Forest Service Decision Making, 20 ENVTL. L. 703, 703 (1990) (stating that NEPA "accelerated and
stimulated" positive changes in the Forest Service); Dinah Bear, Some Modest Suggestions for
Improving Implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 931,
931 (2003); Caldwell, supra note 22, at 205, 207 (acknowledging that NEPA's procedural reform
has "improved the quality of public planning and decisionmaking"); James L. Connaughton,
Chairman, President's Council on Envtl. Quality, Modernizing the National Environmental Policy
Act: Back to the Future (Apr. 10, 2003), in 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 5 (2003) (asserting that while
a small aspect of NEPA has "drawn heat," NEPA has worked well); Paul J. Culhane, NEPA's Effect
on Agency Decision Making: NEPA 's Impacts on Federal Agencies, Anticipated and Unanticipated,
20 ENVTL. L. 681, 681-93 (1990) (stating that NEPA resulted in the consideration of environmental
impacts in administrative decisions, the diversification of agency staffs, and public participation);
Houck, supra note 21, at 188-91 (remarking that despite its problems, NEPA has still pressured
federal decision making, provided more environmental alternatives, and brought the public into the
process); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing
Government's Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 906 (2002) ("NEPA
transformed the institutional landscape in its revolutionary youth, bringing important and lasting
changes to the way government does business."); Mary H. O'Brien, NEPA as It Was Meant to Be:
NCAP v. Block, Herbicides, and Region 6 Forest Service, 20 ENVTL. L. 735, 736 (1990)
(contending that NEPA spurred positive changes for the Forest Service's vegetation management).
26. Culhane, supra note 25, at 695-96, 702. Culhane notes, "NEPA does not explicitly provide
EIS writers with standards for weighing environmental costs against asserted project benefits, much
less with a technical preference fuiction." Id. at 695. Thus, agencies seek to compile information
appropriate to a rationalist decision, but the information is used for a different and less decisive
purpose. See id. at 693-95 ("The NEPA process has adopted the form, not the substance, of the
rational-comprehensive-optimizing model of decision making."). Culhane applies garbage-can
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needed to support a rationalist decision is overkill if agencies need only
compile and "consider" this information as they exercise their discretion on
which values to prioritize and which to sacrifice. A substantive environ-
mental standard could address this critique by focusing NEPA's open-ended
information demands.
However, the absence of a substantive standard for environmental
protection is not the only criticism of NEPA's design. There are a number of
other significant critiques of NEPA that should be considered in assessing its
capacity to define and protect a public natural resource legacy. In particular,
commentators have focused attention on various shortcomings in how
information is deployed under NEPA. A frequent criticism centers on
NEPA's central focus on the preparation of a document-an environmental
impact statement (EIS) or an environmental assessment (EA)-and the
resulting emphasis on the quantity of information collected.27 Many critics
concur that "[t]he means have become ends in themselves. '28 The statute
enshrines adequate documentation as the primary enforceable obligation of
the agency and therefore, the agency focuses primarily on assembling enough
documentation. Challenges to agency compliance with NEPA also typically
focus on adequacy of the relevant documents, and judicial decisions in
successful challenges to agency NEPA compliance frequently turn on gaps in
these documents-information not included, analysis not provided,
alternatives not developed.29 As several commentators have observed, the
decision theory to describe the highly politicized decision-making context in which NEPA
compliance occurs. Id. at 682-89, 695-96. This may explain why the CEQ observed in its report
NEPA AT TWENTY-FIVE, supra note 25, at 28, that environmental impact statements (EISs) often
have more data than needed, but not enough analysis of the data focused on "the decision" and
expressed in clear, concise language. The CEQ then states that "NEPA is about making choices not
endlessly collecting raw data." Id. One might say that Cuihane's point is that because NEPA lacks
any substantive focus or goal for the agency, NEPA is about endlessly collecting raw data-it does
not provide any guidance on how to make decisions.
27. The foundation of the EIS requirement is the statute's mandate that agencies prepare a
detailed statement. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (detailing the required information to be included in
a report or recommendation). CEQ regulations have elaborated to mandate preparation of various
documents depending on the nature of the impacts of the proposed action or the phase of the
agency's decision-making process. These include EAs, findings of no significant impact (FONSIs),
supplemental ElSs, programmatic EISs, and records of decision. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4, 1502.2,
1502.20, 1508.28 (providing instructions for the preparation of EAs, FONSIs, and EISs).
28. Culhane, supra note 25, at 700; see also NEPA AT TWENTY-FIVE, supra note 25, at iii
(remarking that some agencies may "act as if the detailed statement called for in the statute is an end
in itself, rather than a tool to enhance and improve decision-making").
29. See, e.g., Ecology Ctr., Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.3d 1057, 1065-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that
a U.S. Forest Service EIS for salvage harvesting of old-growth forest habitat violated NEPA
because it failed to adequately explain the basis for the Service's conclusion that eliminating a
portion of habitat would not adversely affect the viability of Black-backed Woodpeckers in the
area); Washington County, N.C. v. U.S. Dep't of Navy, 357 F. Supp. 2d 861, 861 (E.D. N.C. 2005)
(finding that a final environmental impact statement (FEIS) prepared by the Department of Navy
failed to adequately consider scientific literature in analyzing the impacts on lakes and waterfowl, as
required under NEPA); Sierra Club v. Bosworth, 199 F. Supp. 2d 971, 971 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
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result is to encourage agencies to gold-plate their EISs by including every
conceivably relevant piece of information to avoid reversal. 30  The result is
overly lengthy documents that are less valuable than more concise, focused
documents would be.
Another consequence of the emphasis on comprehensiveness is that it
delays completion of EISs, therefore delaying the agency's consideration of
the information in the document as part of its underlying decision-making
process. It is widely agreed that consideration of impacts and alternatives
must occur early in the decision-making process to be effective. 31  Delays
increase the risk that a particular project alternative and design may become
entrenched in decision makers' and proponents' minds before the EIS or EA
is complete, and thus before the complete range of alternatives and impacts
are fully developed. This undermines a central goal of NEPA compliance-
to inform agency decision making.
Overly lengthy documents also create barriers to public participation for
those who seek to review an EIS and participate in the comment process.
Wading through unnecessarily lengthy documents demands additional time
by the interested public and may increase the cost of obtaining needed
technical expertise. Excessive length can also work against transparency.
Key information is harder to find when it is buried within five volumes, each
several hundred pages in length.
A second frequently voiced criticism of NEPA's use of information is
the uneven quality of the information contained in NEPA documents.32 In
some measure, this relates to the information-quantity problem discussed
above. In their efforts to create EISs and EAs that are unassailable, agencies
may include marginally relevant or poor quality information. Not only does
this produce the problems described above, the inclusion of poor quality
information can also lead to worse decisions.
(granting summary judgment where an EIS prepared by the U.S. Forest Service did not adequately
disclose and analyze the environmental impacts of post-fire logging and fuel-break maintenance).
30. See NEPA AT TWENTY-FIVE, supra note 25, at iii (observing that a result of NEPA is
"endless documentation"); Culhane, supra note 25, at 693-94 (giving an example of the massive
documentation produced due to the requirements, yet reporting that the quality of these documents
is deficient); Karkkamen, supra note 25, at 917-19 (stressing that agencies produce overly detailed
records to "bullet-proof' their decisions even though the NEPA requirements do not necessarily
result in improving the quality of these records).
31. See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.2 (2000) ("Agencies shall integrate the NEPA process with other
planning at the earliest possible time to insure [sic] that planning and decisions reflect
environmental values, to avoid delays later in the process, and to head off potential conflicts.");
NEPA AT TWENTY-FIVE, supra note 25, at 11 (positing that the earlier agencies incorporate
NEPA's framework into their planning process, the more successful the outcome of the agencies'
proposals); Bear, supra note 25, at 941 (suggesting that "much of the time, information matters a
lot" in the decision-making process); Karkkainen, supra note 25, at 924-25 (proposing that starting
the NEPA analyses earlier is more beneficial to the decision-making process).
32. See Culhane, supra note 25, at 694 (discussing multiple studies that show widespread
inaccuracies in EISs); Karkkainen, supra note 25, at 921-23 (suggesting that the quantity of
information contained in NEPA documents dilutes its quality).
2008] 1583
Texas Law Review
A third major criticism of NEPA's use of information is the
unnecessarily narrow focus of the information collected and the limited use
to which the information is put. NEPA documents are prepared for the
decision on whether to permit, fund, or undertake a single proposed action;
they are rarely considered thereafter, except in litigation regarding NEPA
compliance. Commentators have noted many shortcomings that attend this
one-shot use of EISs. 3 3  First, there is a huge investment of resources to
collect and analyze information in the course of preparing an EIS, yet the
statute creates no incentive to tailor the information collection or presentation
so that it may have use in other contexts. 34 The obsessive focus on the EIS
precludes realizing the full value of the information by putting it into a more
widely usable format.
Another undesirable consequence of the narrow focus on the decision
point is the lack of any incentive or framework for postdecision monitoring
of environmental conditions. Such monitoring would serve a number of
beneficial purposes. First, agencies could learn from this check on the
accuracy of their ex ante predictions about environmental impacts.35
Collecting this information would enhance the database available to the
agencies making future decisions, and enable agencies to engage in
continuous learning to improve their assessment and decision-making
capacity. In contrast, the general wisdom is that information and data
gathered in EISs collect dust on shelves.3 6 Beyond the opportunity for
learning, postdecision monitoring also would open the door to permit
adaptive management in implementing the relevant decision. 37 If monitoring
revealed unanticipated environmental impacts, the agency might choose to
undertake additional mitigation measures or alter its course of action.
A related criticism of the lack of postdecision monitoring arises from
agencies' frequent reliance on mitigation as an essential aspect of NEPA
compliance. Under CEQ regulations, agencies may avoid preparation of an
EIS for a proposed major federal action that would significantly affect the
human environment if, by virtue of mitigation measures, the impacts can be
33. E.g., Bear, supra note 25, at 944-45 (listing the consequences of the one-time use of the
EISs); Karkkainen, supra note 25, at 925-32 (explaining the problems associated with NEPA's one-
time predictive approach); see also NEPA AT TWENTY-FIVE, supra note 25, at 31-34 (pointing out
the benefits of continuous adaptive management based on initial NEPA reports); Connaughton,
supra note 25, at 9-10 (proposing a requirement of adaptive management and continual
monitonng).
34. See Karkkainen, supra note 25, at 923 (observing that the project-specific nature of NEPA
reports prevents the use of these reports in other contexts).
35. Id. at 907-08.
36. See id. at 927 (stating that NEPA does not generally require any "post-project assessment").
37. Id. at 907-08; NEPA AT TWENTY-FIVE, supra note 25, at 31-34; NEPA TASK FORCE,
REPORT TO THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: MODERNIZING NEPA IMPLEMENTATION
45 (2003) [hereinafter NEPA TASK FORCE REPORT], available at http://ceq.eh.doe.gov/ntf/
report/finalreport.pdf.
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reduced below the level of "significance." 38 This practice has generated
considerable controversy,39 largely because there is no mandatory monitoring
or enforcement to determine if the promised mitigation measures are
undertaken.4 0 Postdecision monitoring is widely viewed as a critical missing
component in NEPA practice.4'
Finally, many critics have noted that despite a mandate to account for
cumulative impacts, 4' NEPA has not been very successful in generating
information needed to permit the assessment of cumulative impacts.43 Thus,
while NEPA may improve agency decision making by permitting assessment
of the incremental impacts of individual actions, it seems less well suited to
assessing cumulative effect-a critical component of any effort to preserve a
public natural resource legacy.
Calls for NEPA reform on the points described above have not gone
unheeded over the past decade, and various initiatives have been launched by
both supporters and critics of NEPA. Among efforts to assess NEPA's
effectiveness, identify problems, and propose solutions, the Clinton
Administration undertook a review of NEPA on the twenty-fifth anniversary
of its enactment, resulting in a 1997 report.44 Under the George W. Bush
Administration, the CEQ convened a NEPA Task Force that produced a 2003
38. See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(e) (2008) (allowing the agency to prepare a FONSI in lieu of an
EIS).
39. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 340 (1989) (citing to an
EIS's assertion that numerous mitigation measures discussed in the study would greatly reduce the
impacts of the proposed project); Blumm, supra note 21, at 476-77 (relating criticisms of using
empty mitigation promises to avoid submitting an EIS, and offering critics' suggestions on how to
enforce these promises); Whitney Deacon, The Bush Administration's Attack on the Environment;
Target: NEPA's Environmental Impact Statement, 10 Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 147, 151
(2003) (concluding that mitigation efforts can result in ineffective programs that are immune to any
accountability). But cf Karkkainen, supra note 25, at 908, 934-36 (advocating use of mitigated
FONSIs with postdecision monitoring and enforcement of mitigation commitments).
40. See NEPA AT TWENTY-FIvE, supra note 25, at 31 (reporting that agencies usually do not
gather data on their mitigation efforts); NEPA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 37, at 45 (finding
that regulations do not require monitoring of the traditional "predict-mitigate-implement" model);
Blumm, supra note 21, at 460 (presenting a critic's proposal on enforcing mitigation measures by
amending the regulations); Deacon, supra note 39, at 151 ("[B]ecause there is no post-project
review of the accuracy of the predictions made in the EIS or the EA, there is no liability for the
inaccuracy, which effectively means there is no accountability."); Karkkainen, supra note 25, at 936
(acknowledging that NEPA does not require implementation of mitigation measures).
41. See Dinah Bear, Some Modest Suggestions for Improving Implementation of the National
Environmental Policy Act, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 931, 941-48 (2003) (proposing implementation
of postdecision monitoring).
42. The CEQ's regulations call for the consideration of cumulative impacts of related actions in
determining whether an action is significant and an EIS is required. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(7).
43. See Terence L. Thatcher, Understanding Interdependence in the Natural Environment:
Some Thoughts on Cumulative Impact Assessment Under the National Environmental Policy Act, 20
ENVTL. L. 611, 617-28 (1990) (surveying the confusing standards that courts have developed in
trying to interpret the requirement).
44. NEPA AT TWENTY-FIVE, supra note 25.
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report.45 Following this report, the Task Force held regional hearings and
produced several follow-up reports.46 In 2005, led by Representative Richard
Pombo, the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Resources
commissioned its own task force focused on reforming NEPA.47 Yet the
statute remains unchanged.
Of course, the limited success achieved by the frequent calls to reform
NEPA to enhance its conservation potential can be ascribed in part to the
lack of political will. And without the political will, no reform in any shape
will occur. However, even assuming the political will to protect a legacy,
efforts to amend a statute such as NEPA can easily be derailed by shifting
focus to NEPA's shortcomings. For example, any proposal to strengthen
NEPA is easily (if inaccurately) critiqued as destined to produce only more
paperwork and delay. Moreover, any effort to reform existing environmental
laws can generate as much opposition as enthusiasm-even from
conservation groups-because they justifiably fear that opening the statutes
to legislative reform will end up weakening them. Thus, timid, easily
attacked reforms and tepid support make meaningful success in NEPA
reform unlikely.
Taken together, all of NEPA's shortcomings and the stalemate in NEPA
reform efforts indicate that an approach that complements NEPA, rather than
seeking to amend it, may better achieve the goal of protecting a public
natural resource legacy. Part III therefore elaborates a vision of a distinct
Legacy Act that makes the definition and protection of a public natural
resource legacy its central objective. It then explains how a Legacy Act
could effectively harness the power of information and avoid the
shortcomings of NEPA.
45. NEPA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 37.
46. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE NEPA: HAVING YOUR VOICE
HEARD (2007), available at http://ceq.eh.doe.gov/nepa/CitizensGuideDec07.pdf; COUNCIL ON
ENVTL. QUALITY, ALIGNING NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT PROCESSES WITH
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: A GUIDE FOR NEPA AND EMS PRACTITIONERS
(2007), available at http://ceq.eh.doe.gov/nepa/nepapubs/Aligning-NEPAProcesseswith_
EnvironmentalManagement Systems 2007.pdf; COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, COLLABORATION
IN NEPA: A HANDBOOK FOR NEPA PRACTITIONERS (2007), available at http://www.nepa.gov/
ntf/Collaboration in NEPA Oct 2007.pdf.
47. See TASK FORCE ON IMPROVING THE NAT'L ENVTL. POLICY ACT AND TASK FORCE ON
UPDATING THE NAT'L ENVTL. POLICY ACT, COMM. ON RES., U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
INITIAL FINDINGS AND DRAFT RECOMMENDATIONS 25-29 (2005), available at
http://republicans.resourcescommittee.house.gov/archives/iiOO/nepataskforce/report/nepareport fna
ldraft.pdf (proposing NEPA amendments to, among other things, clarify certain statutory terms, and
enhance participation and coordination among the public and governmental bodies and between
agencies).
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III. Harnessing the Power of Information to Protect our Public Natural
Resource Legacy
A. The Contours of a National Environmental Legacy Act
The concept of a National Environmental Legacy Act 48 (NELA) is to
give effect to the goal of defining and protecting a legacy of public natural
resources 49 for future generations, something no statute has done successfully
to date. Building on the goals already expressed in numerous laws, a Legacy
Act would require management of public resources that accounts for the
impact of our decisions on the resources available to future generations.
Thus, NELA might be characterized as a successor to NEPA's legacy
ambition, but with teeth and long-range vision. Embracing the Legacy Act
concept would impel us to identify our long-term goals and then help chart
and maintain a course to achieve our shared goals. It would also improve our
decisions over the long term by generating the information base needed to
support adaptive learning.
At a minimum, the idea of a Legacy Act denotes a statute that defines
our public natural resource legacy and prohibits all actions that will degrade
or deplete the defined legacy. These two core objectives of the statute are
guideposts that suggest the general contours of the statute. We provide here
the outline of a statute that could achieve these two objectives by using
information effectively.50
1. Section 1: Goals and Policy.-The statute should set out the goal of
defining and preserving a legacy of public natural resources for present and
future generations of Americans. In its statement of goals and policy, the
statute should describe in general terms the legacy we wish to leave, defined
in relation to our existing stock of resources. That legacy might be an
identical stock of resources, a stock of resources that is not substantially
diminished in quality or quantity, or some other description of the quantity
and quality of resources we desire to preserve for future generations.
48. This Article proposes a federal statute, but the concept and design of the Legacy Act could
easily be adapted for adoption as a state statute as well. As with NEPA, state analogues could serve
distinct purposes. A state Legacy Act would presumably focus on protecting a legacy of state-
owned and public-trust natural resources rather than federal resources.
49. For purposes of discussion, we propose a very broad definition of public natural resources
that includes all water and land, as well as the ecosystems, biodiversity, and minerals found on or in
them that are under federal ownership or are protected by the federal public-trust doctrine.
50. Designing the statute will require both considerable technical work and further elaboration
of value choices. Although we have included section numbers for ease of reference, the sketch that
follows is a starting point for discussion, not a detailed statutory proposal.
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2. Section 2: Designation of a Legacy Period.-The statute should
designate a fixed period of years that constitutes the legacy period, over
which public natural resources must be conserved.5'
3. Section 3: Prohibited Degradation or Depletion of Legacy
Resources.-The statute should set forth in clear and enforceable terms the
maximum level of degradation or depletion of resources that will be
permitted over the course of the legacy period, if any. This is the critical,
enforceable substantive standard of the statute. The statute should in clear
and broad terms prohibit actions by any person,52 whether public or private,
that may cause impermissible degradation or depletion of a legacy
resource-that is, degradation or depletion that exceeds the substantive
standard over the legacy period.53
4. Section 4: Designation of Legacy Resource Stewardship Agencies.-
The statute should designate an existing federal agency to serve as the
resource stewardship agency ("stewardship agency") for each public natural
resource. 
54
5. Section 5: Development of Metrics and Collection of Baseline Data
on Resource Quantity and Quality.-Each stewardship agency should be
charged with developing and implementing regulations that designate the
appropriate metrics of quantity and quality for the resources for which they
are stewards. The statute should both mandate and authorize adequate
funding for collection of baseline data on the quantity and quality of all
public natural resources employing these metrics.
6. Section 6: Promulgation of Rules Defining Maximum Permitted
Levels of Degradation and Depletion Over the Legacy Period.-Each
stewardship agency should be required to promulgate rules that implement
§ 3 of the statute by elaborating the quantity and quality of degradation or
depletion of the relevant resource that would constitute impermissible
51. At the conclusion of each legacy period, a new legacy period would commence.
52. The term should be very broadly defined to include all public and private actors, including
the designated stewardship agency. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 3, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1532(13) (2000) (defining the term "person" expansively to include both public and private
entities, as well as "any other entity subject to the jurisdiction of the United States").
53. For purposes of discussion, we propose that this standard proscribe all actions that will lead
to significant degradation or depletion of covered resources over the legacy period, unless the
proponent of action can demonstrate that substitute resources are likely to be available. NELA
represents a break with most current law by shifting the burden to show the availability of substitute
resources to the proponent of action.
54. Where an agency has stewardship responsibilities for a particular resource under existing
law, it would seem most efficient to designate that agency for this role, unless past experience
suggests this would be inconsistent with achieving the purposes of the Act.
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degradation or depletion under the statute over the course of the legacy
period, using the metrics developed under § 5.
7. Section 7: Stewardship Agency Mandate to Ensure No Impermissible
Degradation Will Occur (Prohibition and Planning).-The statute should
limit stewardship agencies' discretion under existing law by requiring each
stewardship agency to ensure that no degradation or depletion in excess of
permissible limits will occur during the legacy period. The statute should
also specifically require that each stewardship agency develop a "legacy
plan" to demonstrate how it will ensure that the mandated resource legacy is
conserved over the legacy period and to conform its actions to that plan.55
8. Section 8: Enforcement.-To ensure enforcement, both stewardship
agencies and citizens should be granted enforcement authority. A citizen-suit
provision with fee-shifting 56 would be a critical component of the statute. It
should authorize any person to bring an action to enjoin and seek penalties
for actions that impermissibly degrade or deplete public natural resources.
The statute should also permit citizen suits against the stewardship agency to
enforce other agency duties under the statute, including the duties to collect
information, to develop or update a legacy plan, and to conform agency
actions to the terms of the legacy plan.
9. Section 9: Monitoring and Adaptive Learning.-The statute should
require and authorize funding for stewardship agencies to undertake ongoing
monitoring of legacy resources and should require agencies to update legacy
plans according to a fixed schedule.
10. Section 10: Exceptions.-The statute should allow for a narrow
exception to its prohibition on degradation or depletion in two circumstances:
if it can be shown by clear and convincing evidence that (1) foreseeable
technological advances or the availability of substitute resources will obviate
the need for or value of the resource in question, or (2) the action is clearly in
the public interest, no acceptable alternative that will not cause impermissible
degradation or depletion exists that will adequately serve the public interest,
55. For those agencies that already undertake planning regarding the relevant resource, this duty
should be coordinated with the agencies' planning duties under existing enabling acts to achieve
maximum efficiency in implementation. The statute should make clear that the general prohibition
on actions that impermissibly degrade or deplete legacy resources applies both to private actors and
to stewardship-agency decisions affecting the relevant resource-including management,
permitting, leasing, and all other decisions.
56. Fee-shifting permits a judge to award costs of litigation to a prevailing party in a suit-such
as a citizen suit under the Clean Air or Clean Water Acts. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7604(d) (2000) (providing that a judge "may award costs of litigation" to a prevailing party in a
Clean Air Act citizen's suit).
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and the impacts on the services and values to be impaired can and will be
mitigated.57
B. Harnessing the Power of Information Under a Legacy Act
This subpart elaborates on how a Legacy Act would harness the power
of information, taking account of both our experiences under NEPA,
described above, and the broader literature on information problems in envi-
ronmental regulation. It highlights how a Legacy Act could avoid the short-
comings associated with NEPA and meet other pervasive challenges, in-
cluding promoting transparency, addressing uncertainty, and overcoming
information asymmetries.
1. Avoiding Excessive Open-Ended Information Demands.-The
Legacy Act responds to our experiences under NEPA by ensuring that the
information collected is well matched to the uses to which it is put.
Information is generated by the agency for a particular decisional purpose: to
define the legacy and protect it from impermissible degradation and
depletion. The agency is directly required to collect baseline information for
this purpose and to use this information in its planning processes. This
responds to Paul Culhane's observations about the incongruity of attempting
to impose a rationalist comprehensive model of information collection and
analysis in a process with no goals other than assembly of complete
information.58
NELA also responds to the primary critique of the collection and use of
information under NEPA-that the EIS becomes an end in itself.59  The
focus of compliance under NELA would not be the adequacy of the
documentation produced, but (1) whether any planned action would cause
degradation or depletion that exceeds the statutory threshold, and (2) whether
agency plans would ensure compliance with the statutory standard. Review
of agency and other parties' actions under the Legacy Act would therefore
focus less on adequacy of particular documentation, and more on substantive
compliance with NELA's central mandate-the prohibition of impermissible
degradation or depletion of the legacy.
57. The standard governing exceptions could apply to two different contexts under the statute.
First, it could apply in the context of an agency developing its rules under § 6 of the statute. In this
context, if the agency could demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that either prong of the
exception is met with respect to a particular resource or value, the statutory mandate for preserving
the resource would not apply to the extent the evidence warrants, and rules that deviated from the
statutory mandate could be upheld as valid to the extent an exception was warrranted. The second
context would be as a defense to an enforcement action. A party subject to enforcement for
impermissible degradation or depletion could defend against enforcement if the party could
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that either prong of the exception is met regarding
the action giving rise to the enforcement.
58. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
59. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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Under NEPA, the time-consuming nature of EIS preparation has led to a
strong focus on how to avoid the need for an EIS.60 NELA responds to this
by departing from the impact-assessment model altogether, and imposing
strict liability for impermissible degradation, coupled with agency collection
of baseline data and planning. NELA does not create additional lengthy
information-collection and review processes that must precede action. This
should eliminate the incentive to avoid procedural compliance that has
plagued NEPA.
The criticism often leveled at NEPA-that it demands too much
information--could also be leveled at the requirement under the Legacy Act
that relevant agencies collect and analyze baseline data and engage in
ongoing monitoring. One might criticize this as creating an infinite demand
for information. However, as envisioned, NELA should not create such
unrealistic or unbounded information demands. 61 To avoid this problem and
better define the information to be generated, we adapt an idea proposed by
Sidney Shapiro and Rena Steinzor in this Symposium: the use of positive
metrics that serve as shorthands for assessing the quantity and quality of
resources. 62  Shapiro and Steinzor define metrics as short and concise
measures, selected by an independent body of experts, addressing the most
important relevant issues and focusing on outcome rather than output. 63 The
metrics under NELA would be selected to assess the status of resource
quantity and quality, in place of comprehensive information requirements.
Notwithstanding the challenge that developing such metrics presents, there is
a wealth of expertise that agencies have developed in implementing NEPA
60. See, e.g., Blumm, supra note 21, at 459 (reporting on a study of cases where promised
mitigations, which were used to conclude that EISs were unnecessary, were later ignored); Deacon,
supra note 39, at 153-54 (noting various agencies' broad use of categorical exemptions); Sarah
McQuillen Tran, Rebuilding Our Power Without Procedural Safeguards: A Federal Response to the
2005 Hurricanes That Outlasted the "Emergency", 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 217, 244-50 (2008)
(criticizing FERC's broad use of categorical exemptions under NEPA following Hurricane Katrina).
61. Moreover, information on the quantity of certain resources may already be compiled and
may be relatively well defined and simple to assemble. For example, we may have reasonably
accurate estimates of the acres of forest or grasslands or the amount of certain mineral resources
located on public lands. Nonetheless, even the metrics selected for the quantity of resources may
require more than just crude cumulative numbers. For example, distribution of the resource may
also be important to consider in some cases. In setting the metrics to be used in assessing resource
quantity for forests, it would be reasonable to consider not just the existence of acres of public
forests, but their distribution across the landscape and the diversity in forest types. This could be
considered as an aspect of quantity or viewed as a qualitative value.
62. Professors Shapiro and Steinzor propose positive metrics in a different context-to promote
agency accountability. See generally Sidney A. Shapiro & Rena Steinzor, Capture, Accountability,
and Regulatory Metrics, 86 TEXAS L. REV. 1741 (2008) (criticizing current efforts at agency
accountability and proposing positive metrics as an alternative). It would make sense to develop
metrics for use in multiple contexts. A single metric might be used to monitor both agency
accountability and compliance with the Legacy Act.
63. Id at 1770-71.
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and other resource-management and -protection statutes, and much academic
expertise that could be brought to bear on the task.64
2. Ensuring the Quality of Information.-NELA also seeks to address
the third critique of NEPA-the uneven quality of information contained in
EISs. First, the Legacy Act removes one incentive that tends to motivate
collection of poor-quality or irrelevant data under NEPA-the emphasis on
the quantity of information generated. In addition, under the design of
NELA, two specific types of information are collected: (1) baseline data on
the quantity and quality of resources, and (2) ongoing data to monitor the
quantity and quality of resources over time. As noted above, the use of
metrics would focus the collection of both types of information. Not only
could the metrics determine the volume of information required to be
collected, they could also provide standards for quality and promote
standardization. Thus the metrics would provide guidance on the quality of
the data to be collected under the Act and on the methodologies to be
employed in assessing resource quality. Developing metrics under NELA
should be undertaken by an independent body with relevant expertise.65
Enactment of this new statute would provide an opportunity to take
stock of new and emerging methods for assessing the quality of natural
resources and the effects of human activity on the quantity and quality of
natural resources. NELA should incorporate the most accurate and
sophisticated tools for assessing the quantity and quality of our public
resources and for predicting how proposed actions will affect public natural
resources. There are many emerging analytic methods that may hold
promise for developing metrics of resource quantity and quality without
replicating what Professor Brad Karkkainen has called NEPA's "seemingly
insatiable demand for information. ' '66  These methodologies include eco-
logical economics, ecosystem-services valuation, emergy analysis, scenario
building, environmental accounting, sustainability-impact assessment,
ecological-footprint analysis, and a variety of sustainability indices. While
none of these may yet be fully vetted or ready or appropriate for large-scale
incorporation in a legal framework, even a brief survey of the literature
reflects many fundamental insights and developments in our understanding
that remain largely excluded from or at the margins of current impact-
64. Professors Shapiro and Steinzor emphasize the importance of independence in the context
of developing metrics for agency accountability as well. Id. at 1775-77. One possibility would be
to provide in the statute for the creation of an interdisciplinary committee of experts to help develop
the metrics, following the model of the Committee of Scientists that was created to develop
regulations under the National Forest Management Act. A broader undertaking would model the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change or the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. This would
bring together scientists to assess the state of knowledge, determine whether consensus exists on the
state of our information and analytic methods, and assess accordingly the impacts of decisions on
resources.
65. Id. at 1775-77.
66. Karkkainen, supra note 25, at 920.
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assessment practice. What we suggest is a focused effort to assess elements
of these approaches that warrant incorporation into our analytic methods for
assessing impacts on our resources.67
For example, critics of the heavy reliance on neoclassical economics
under current law and policy have pointed to the undisputed inadequacies of
microeconomics to assess the impacts of decisions on resources in a world in
which there are real physical limits to available resources. 68  Ecological
economists introduce into decision making the norm of sustainable use of
resources, alongside the neoclassical economic norm of efficiency. 69 Eco-
logical economics offers an analytic approach well suited to more fully
assessing the impacts of human activity on our resource legacy, focused as
the discipline is on the intersection of dynamic human and ecosystem
processes.
70
Ecosystem-services valuation offers another approach to identifying and
evaluating both baselines of resource quality and the impacts of human
activity on natural resources and the values and services they provide. First
brought to widespread attention by Gretchen Daily,71 Geoffrey Heal, 72 and
Robert Costanza, 73 the idea of ecosystem services and its potential
application has been explored by several legal scholars in the period since,
most notably, J.B. Ruhl and Jim Salzman.74 The idea that we need to better
identify and assess the value of the services and values associated with
natural systems fits well with the idea at the heart of the Legacy Act-that
we need to better assess the impacts of our actions on public natural
67. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
68. See Douglas A. Kysar, Law, Environment, and Vision, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 675, 676 (2003)
[hereinafter Kysar, Law, Environment] ("[B]ecause mainstream economic accounts generally fail to
recognize absolute limits imposed by nature .... they also fail to provide an adequate conceptual
basis on which to make [required] political judgments .... ); Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainability,
Distribution, and the Macroeconomic Analysis of Law, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1, 17-21 (2001) [hereinafter
Kysar, Sustainability] (surveying examples of the limits on natural resources and waste that render
the macroeconomic conception of market activity erroneous).
69. Kysar, Sustainability, supra note 68, at 6-7.
70. Id at 8.
71. See NATURE'S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS (Gretchen
C. Daily ed., 1997).
72. See GEOFFREY HEAL, NATURE AND THE MARKETPLACE: CAPTURING THE VALUE OF
ECOSYSTEM SERVICES (2000).
73. See Robert Costanza et al., The Value of the World's Ecosystem Services and Natural
Capital, 387 NATURE 253 (1997).
74. E.g., J.B. RUHL, STEVEN E. KRAFT & CHRISTOPHER L. LANT, THE LAW AND POLICY OF
ECOSYSTEM SERVICES (2007); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Ecosystem Services and the Public
Trust Doctrine: Working Change from Within, 15 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 223 (2006); J.B.
Ruhl & R. Juge Gregg, Integrating Ecosystem Services into Environmental Law: A Case Study of
Wetlands Mitigation Banking, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 365 (2001); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, The
Law and Policy Beginnings of Ecosystem Services, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 157 (2007); James
Salzman, Creating Markets for Ecosystem Services: Notes from the Field, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870
(2005); James Salzman, A Field of Green? The Past and Future of Ecosystem Services, 21 J. LAND
USE & ENVTL. L. 133 (2006); James Salzman et al., Protecting Ecosystem Services: Science,
Economics, and Law, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 309 (2001).
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resources, broadly defined. Ecosystem-services valuation could be used to
develop metrics of quality for public natural resources.
The challenges that attend systematic assessment of ecosystem services
are numerous. In their recent book, Ruhl, Kraft, and Lant carefully outline
the challenges and complexity of the undertaking-the tremendous variation
in ecosystem services, their geographic distribution, and how users avail
themselves of the services.75  Moreover, they acknowledge that the
desirability and ultimate value of the effort to translate the value of
ecosystem services into dollars is contested.76 Nonetheless, Ruhl, Kraft, and
Lant provide a thoughtful assessment of the components and qualities that
characterize ecosystem services, 77 a framework for conceptualizing them
geographically,78 and an outline of the key decisions that should attend any
effort to operationalize ecosystem-services valuation.79
Emergy synthesis offers another example of an emerging method of
accounting for the value of natural resource systems that could be applied as
a metric of environmental quality under the Legacy Act.8°  Unlike
ecosystem-services valuation, emergy synthesis seeks to account for the
dynamic value of natural systems by translating these into a measure of the
energy embodied in the system, using the unit of emjoules. This method,
developed by ecologist H.T. Odum, has been used by ecologists, as well as
governmental and nongovernmental agencies, but it is only beginning to be
explored as a tool for use in law.
81
Ecological-footprint analysis (EFA) is an index of natural resource
consumption reported in the number of global hectares necessary to support
one person.82 While this measure does not itself seek to assess the impacts of
a particular proposed action, it is possible that the analytic approach and
metrics used in EFA to assess how the sum of an individual's myriad daily
decisions translates into resource consumption could be employed by
75. RUHL, KRAFT & LANT, supra note 74, at 9, 13-35.
76. Id. at31.
77. Id at23-33.
78. Id. at 39-56.
79. Id. at 249-92.
80. See Mary Jane Angelo & Mark T. Brown, Integrating Emergy Synthesis into Environmental
Law, 37 ENVTL. L. 963, 971-74 (2007) (providing an overview ofemergy synthesis).
81. See id. at 964-66 (discussing the origin of the concept of emergy and the aim of the article
to demonstrate emergy's "potential to revolutionize environmental law").
82. Danielle Marie Devincenzo-King, Emergy Accounting of the Resource Basis of Nations,
Human Well-Being and International Debt 5 (2006) (unpublished master's thesis, University of
Florida) (on file with the Texas Law Review). See also Redefining Progress, Earth Day Footprint
Quiz, http://www.myfootprint.org. For example, the ecological footprint of one of the authors of
this Article is 14 acres, compared to the average footprint of 24 acres per person in the United
States. There are 4.5 biologically productive acres per person worldwide. Thus, if everyone lived
like the author-with a footprint of 14 acres each-we would need 3.1 Earths to support our current
world population.
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agencies as they project future resource demands in their legacy plans and
assess whether such demands will violate the Act.
Various emerging sustainability and well-being indices seek to assess
how well countries achieve sustainable use of resources while promoting
human welfare.83 These may provide useful comparators, identifying other
countries that may be employing alternative technology or substitute
resources that can help maintain compliance with the Legacy Act.
Because NELA requires agencies to undertake planning to ensure
compliance over a relatively long time horizon, it requires more rigorous
consideration of anticipated cumulative impacts than is generally undertaken
under NEPA and other statutes. NELA also requires a careful assessment of
the capacity of renewable resources to replace themselves. 84 Several other
tools that could inform agency information collection and planning that may
address these demands are complexity theory, geographic information
systems (GIS), and scenario building. J.B. Ruhl outlines an approach to
these problems grounded in complexity theory and describes the type of
algorithms we might develop to help us analyze impacts.8 5  Similarly, he
highlights the promise of GIS as a tool for improving our ability to analyze
and understand complex information.86 He also points to the work of others
who have shown the potential of scenario building as a tool for assessing
impacts.87 Scenario building could assist agencies in developing plans that
anticipate resource demands and better prepare them to face resource
demands in light of the constraints imposed by the Act.
3. Promoting Adaptive Learning.-A major criticism of NEPA's use of
information is the narrow use of information at the decision point. This
limits the value of the information collected and precludes adaptive learning.
83. These indices include: the Yale Environmental Sustainability Index (YESI), see DANIEL C.
ESTY ET AL., 2005 ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY INDEX: BENCHMARKING NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL STEWARDSHIP 1 (2005) ("The Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI)
benchmarks the ability of nations to protect the environment over the next several decades."),
available at http://www.yale.edu/esi/ESI2005.pdf; the United Nations Development Programme
Human Development Index (HDI), see Human Development Index (HDI)--Human Development
Reports (UNDP), http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/indices/hdi/ (describing the HDI's method of
measuring development using the indicators of life expectancy, educational attainment, and
income); and the Prescott-Allen Well-Being Index (WI), see ROBERT PRESCOTT-ALLEN, THE
WELLBEING OF NATIONS: A COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY INDEX OF QUALITY OF LIFE AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (2001) (creating an index that juxtaposes individuals' well-beings and
environmental stress).
84. Because the statute focuses on the resources available at the end of the legacy period, the
level of degradation or depletion of renewable resources permitted under the statute would take into
account the resources' capacity to renew themselves over the legacy period.
85. See J.B. Ruhl, Sustainable Development: A Five-Dimensional Algorithm for Environmental
Law, 18 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 31, 56-58 (discussing application of "models of complex adaptive
systems" to "fundamental aspects of sustainable development").
86. Id. at 61-62.
87. Id. at 59-61.
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To ensure that we can learn from the experience during the legacy period, the
Legacy Act should require ongoing monitoring of resources covered under
the Act and regular updating of legacy plans by stewardship agencies. This
would in turn provide data to help agencies and the public make informed
decisions in the future and assess the accuracy of past analyses. Without this
information, we would lose the opportunity to improve decision making by
observing the deviation between ex ante predictions and actual impacts.88
Postdecision monitoring would also permit adaptive responses in cases in
which unanticipated impacts occur and thus adaptive learning. 89
4. Creating Transparency.-NELA's information demands should be
designed with an eye toward maximizing the transparency and usefulness of
the information. Thus, drafters should seek to structure information demands
and analysis so that state and local decision makers, as well as interested
advocates for the public interest, could benefit from the information. This
also would necessitate a design that maximizes transparency, making
information easily and broadly accessible. For example, the statute should
mandate that baseline information and updated monitoring data be made
accessible on the stewardship agency's Web site. Ensuring that the data
generated under NELA are publicly available and in a form that is readily
usable would promote transparency and could enhance the quality of
decision making not just by federal agencies, but by state and local
governments and private enterprise as well. 90 A number of the emerging
analytic approaches designed above have the potential to increase
transparency and facilitate ongoing use of the data collected.
5. Addressing Information Asymmetries.-Professor Wendy Wagner
has described the classic problem of asymmetrical access to relevant
information in the regulatory process.9' When a private party proposes an
action that may degrade or deplete a resource, that party is likely to have
greater access to information about the action it has proposed than others.92
88. Karkkainen, supra note 25, at 938-39.
89. Holly Doremus, Precaution, Science and Learning While Doing in Natural Resource
Management, 82 WASH. L. REv. 547, 550 (2007) (advocating a precautionary approach that
incorporates adaptive learning); Karkkainen, supra note 25, at 938-40 (arguing that allowing
adaptive-management techniques would streamline the NEPA process).
90. See Karkkainen, supra note 25, at 938 (discussing the benefits of process transparency to
agencies, the public, and governmental branches).
91. See Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law to
Produce Needed Information on Health and the Environment, 53 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1625-33 (2004)
(describing the "ignorance equilibrium" and attributing blame to industry's rational aversion to
disclosure of information).
92. In the case of public resources, private actions approved by agencies under traditional
permitting or leasing arrangements are frequently the source of degradation or depletion. In this
situation, the private actor typically has greater access to information about the details of the activity
it has proposed and the likely adverse impacts, creating an information asymmetry. In a typical
permitting or leasing procedure, even if there is a regulatory standard that prohibits or takes
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Under a regulatory scheme that prohibits conduct if adverse effects are
proven, the proponent of an action has little incentive to generate or produce
information about adverse effects. Hampered by the asymmetry, the agency
may not know what information is available or be able to frame requests that
will generate needed information.
The proposed reliance on a strong prohibition may help to alleviate this
problem. Drawing on an idea from contract theory, Professor Karkkainen
has explored how reliance on a "penalty default" can help to solve the
problem of information asymmetries. 93  The Legacy Act follows this
approach by employing a prohibition against degradation.94 Thus, the statute
creates an incentive for the proponent of action to investigate adverse effects
of the proposed action in order to avoid strict liability for violating the
statute. Further, if this inquiry generates information suggesting that an
action may violate the statute, the party has an incentive to generate
information on less damaging alternatives.
6. Coping with Uncertainty.-The obstacles that uncertainty creates for
protecting natural resources, health, and safety under existing statutes are
well documented.95 Many environmental regulatory statutes require that an
agency provide a certain measure of proof of harm before regulatory
negative account of anticipated degradation, the proponent has no incentive to share information on
adverse effects. Even if the actor proposing a degrading or depleting activity is an agency, the
agency itself may have an incentive to withhold information, creating information asymmetry
between the agency and the interested public.
93. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Bottlenecks and Baselines: Tackling Information Deficits in
Environmental Regulation, 86 TEXAS L. REV. 1409, 1419 (2008).
94. A statute that completely prohibited depletion or degradation would be the strongest form of
a penalty default. Although we propose a default that permits some degradation, we follow the
model that has been successfully employed under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), which
prohibits conduct generally rather than establishing a permit process in the first instance. See 16
U.S.C. § 1538 (2000) (making it unlawful to possess, transport, or sell designated species). Our
proposal envisions exceptions under § 10 of the Legacy Act, like § 10 of the ESA. See id. § 1539.
95. See John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: Information, Regulatory Policy,
and Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 333 (1991) (concluding that the uncertainty
of toxic chemicals' effects makes it "nearly impossible to establish a level of regulatory control with
any confidence in its accuracy"); Doremus, supra note 89, at 579 ("Dealing with uncertainty is the
signature challenge of environmental and natural resource decisionmaking."); Holly Doremus, The
Purposes, Effects, and Future of the Endangered Species Act's Best Available Science Mandate, 34
ENVTL. L. 397 (2004) ("Uncertainty is endemic in the ESA context. It can plague our
understanding of... the effect of management actions on species."); Daniel C. Esty, Environmental
Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 115, 117-18 (2004) (blaming recent failures
in environmental regulation on information gaps); Howard A. Latin, The "Significance" of Toxic
Health Risks: An Essay on Legal Decisionmaking Under Uncertainty, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 339, 340-
42 (1982) (criticizing the Supreme Court's response to uncertainty surrounding toxic-substance
regulation); Frederic H. Wagner, Whatever Happened to the National Biological Survey?, 49
BIOSCIENCE 219, 219 (1999) (arguing that a national biological survey containing information on
the habitats of endangered species would prevent disputes regarding use of the habitat); Wagner,
supra note 91, at 1623-24 (arguing that despite the growth of environmental law and regulation
since the 1970s, the quality of most of the air, water, and land in the United States, as well as the
"breaking point" of many ecosystems, remains unknown).
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constraints are imposed. Where the burden of proof falls on the agency
seeking to regulate potentially harmful actions, the inevitability of
incomplete and uncertain information can act as a significant impediment to
regulation.
96
Given the purposes of the Legacy Act and our experience under existing
law, it seems essential that the Legacy Act's prohibition be framed to adopt a
precautionary approach.97 Thus, § 3 of the statute should be framed to
prohibit any person9" from taking any action that may cause significant
degradation or depletion of any legacy resource, or employ similar or even
more precautionary language. The statute should also make explicit that any
doubt created by inadequate or uncertain information should be resolved in
favor of protecting the legacy, because uncertainty will frequently limit our
ability to predict impacts. As Professor Holly Doremus has advocated, this
precautionary approach should be coupled with adaptive learning, which can
reduce uncertainty over time.
99
In addition, the statute could include a transition provision that follows
the penalty-default model, designed to align the interests of resource users
and the public in support of funding the collection of baseline information
and the development of agency rules. The transition provision would
accomplish this by imposing a partial or complete moratorium on some class
of activities affecting legacy resources, pending the collection of baseline
data required under the statute and the development of implementing rules.'00
This would ensure that lack of information does not unduly delay the
statute's implementation and effectiveness. Such a transition provision
would also create an incentive for private parties to share with the agencies
information relevant to the development of baseline resource data, as well as
giving them reason to support prompt promulgation of agency rules
96. See Applegate, supra note 95, at 319 (stating that because of the strict standards necessary
to impose a test rule under the Toxic Substances Control Act, very few test rules have been
promulgated under the statute); Latin, supra note 95, at 381-82 (showing that placing the burden of
proof of harmful effects on an agency attempting to regulate can frustrate the purposes of
environmental legislation).
97. See generally John S. Applegate, The Taming of the Precautionary Principle, 27 WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 13 (2002) (defining the precautionary principle as one that
embodies the ideas that "anthropogenic harm to human health and the environment should be
avoided or minimized through anticipatory, preventive regulatory controls; and, to accomplish this,
activities and technologies whose environmental consequences are uncertain but potentially serious
should be restricted until the uncertainty is largely resolved").
98. The term "person" should be broadly defined. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
99. See Doremus, supra note 89, at 548-50 (arguing that both the precautionary principle and
scientific principles-sometimes thought to be in conflict with each other-should be used in an
environmental decision-making process that emphasizes learning).
100. For example, any individual action that itself would be deemed significant under NEPA
could be prohibited, pending the collection of the relevant information and the development of
agency metrics. Defining the precise class of activities to be proscribed in this transition period
would entail significant value choices.
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implementing the statute, rather than favoring delay.'0 ' As with the
experience under California's Proposition 65 that Professor Karkkainen
describes, this would create an incentive to generate information and support
regulation that typical regulatory statutes lack.1
0 2
IV. Conclusion
It is inevitable that we will leave a natural resource legacy to our
children and grandchildren. This Article takes seriously the idea that
Americans care about that legacy and deserve the opportunity to deliberate
on the contents of their legacy. Under current law and policy, agencies are
afforded broad discretion under both NEPA and substantive public natural
resource-management statutes. The current legal regime fails to provide
adequate tools to enable us to define and protect a natural resource legacy.
Among our current laws, NEPA is a statute both with broadly stated
ambitions to protect a natural resource legacy and a commitment to
harnessing the power of information to achieve that goal. In this Article, we
draw on the lessons learned under NEPA to suggest how we could better
harness the power of information in the service of protecting a natural
resource legacy. This Article suggests that NEPA is inadequate to the task of
protecting a resource legacy. Drawing on the lessons learned under NEPA,
we suggest how a National Environmental Legacy Act could help us to use
information effectively to define and protect a public natural resource legacy.
101. See Wagner, supra note 91, at 1741-42 (describing private parties' incentives to share
information and to support prompt regulation under an approach similar to "penalty defaults").
102. See Karkkainen, supra note 93, at 1432-34 (describing how the inversion of the usual
incentives for potentially regulated business leads to the disclosure of information).
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